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EXCESSIVE REVERSE PAYMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF HATCH-
WAXMAN
Satish Chintapalli
Reverse payments, such as the one at issue in Arkansas
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, are controversial
because they appear to be nothing more than agreements between
competitors not to compete. However, because a patent was
involved, the Federal Circuit refused to declare this agreement
unlawful-even when the patentee offered to pay the alleged
infringer large sums of money to exit the market. The recent
introduction of The Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act is
an attempt by Congress to clarif its intent with respect to reverse
payments under Hatch- Waxman. Although this legislation targets
the right problem, it is too broad a solution because it would
prohibit pro-competitive settlements in some circumstances. This
Recent Development suggests modifying the Act so that such
settlements would be prohibited only where the underlying patent
is likely invalid or not infringed
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2001 anthrax attacks on the United States underscored a
tension in the United States' patent system between the right of a
pharmaceutical drug patentee to settle a patent lawsuit by paying
competitors to leave the market and the goal of providing
consumers with the benefits of competition in the pharmaceutical
2drug industry. During the attacks, Bayer's antibiotic, "Cipro,"
was in heavy demand because it was the only drug initially
J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2010.
2 See Editorial, Cipro Saga Exposes How Drugmakers Protect Profits, USA
TODAY, Oct. 29, 2001, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/
2001-10-29-nceditf.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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approved to treat anthrax inhalation. 3 Thus, supplies of Cipro were
limited.4 This fact exacerbated an already serious public health
emergency.5 In addition, Bayer had paid a rival, Barr Laboratories,
Inc., to exit the market, guaranteeing this limited supply and
illustrating how the interests of patent holders and the public can
diverge sharply.6
This arrangement between Bayer and Barr drew media
criticism. It also sparked a lawsuit by purchasers of Cipro
alleging antitrust violations.8 Ruling on the latest round of this
litigation, the Federal Circuit recently held in In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation9 that a patent settlement
agreement in which Bayer paid Barr Laboratories, Inc. (a generic
challenger) to delay introduction of a generic version of Bayer's
3 Id. The term "Cipro" refers to the compound, ciprofloxacin hydrochloride,
patented by Bayer. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d
1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("More particularly, the patent is directed to
ciprofloxacin hydrochloride, the compound that is the active ingredient in
Cipro@ ('Cipro').").
4 See Editorial, supra note 2.
5 Id. ("As the Cipro example shows, the practices also can have potential
public health implications at a time of national crisis.").
6 Id.; see also James Thuo Gathii, Balancing Patent Rights and Affordability
of Prescription Drugs in Addressing Bio-Terrorism: An Analysis of In Re
Ciproflocacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH.
651, 651-52 (2003) (discussing the problem posed by a single source of Cipro in
the context of bioterrorism).
7 See Editorial, supra note 2. ("Doing so by abusing the patent system,
however, is an affront to consumers who pay the higher bills, and to the public,
which could suffer the consequences in a public health crisis."); see also Sheryl
Gay Stolberg & Jeff Gerth, Keeping Down the Competition; How Companies
Stall Generics And Keep Themselves Healthy, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 23, 2000, at Al,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/23/us/keeping-down-competition-
companies-stall-generics-keep-themselves-
healthy.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all (last visited Mar. 08, 2009) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) (discussing similar prior
settlement agreements within the pharmaceutical industry).
8 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 740, 745
(E.D.N.Y. 2001), remanded to 261 F. Supp. 2d 188 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), appeal
dismissed, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), affd, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
' 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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Cipro did not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.' 0 According to
the Federal Circuit, this settlement, also known as a "reverse
payment" or an "exclusion payment," is not illegal under antitrust
law because the "anti-competitive effects" of the agreement stem
from the "exclusionary zone" of the patent." In other words,
Bayer's patent enabled it to exclude all competition from the
market and Bayer's participation in the settlement agreement,
irrespective of its allegedly anticompetitive features, was a proper
means of exercising this right.12 Moreover, because all patents are
10 Id. at 1327-30 (stating facts of the case); id. at 1341(holding the Sherman
Antitrust Act was not violated).
" Id. at 1329-30 (using the terms "reverse payments" or "exclusion
payments," also using the terms "anti-competitive effects" and "exclusionary
zone"); id. at 1333 (agreeing with the district court that if the agreement's
anticompetitive effects are "within the scope of the . .. patent," such effects
"could not be redressed by antitrust law"); see, e.g., Christopher M. Holman, Do
Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 490, 494 (2007) ("The term 'reverse payment'
has been used as shorthand to characterize a variety of diverse patent settlement
agreements that involve a transfer of consideration from the patent owner to the
alleged infringer."). Some authors argue the terms "reverse payment" or
"exclusion payment" are incorrect because all settlements involve the plaintiff
providing something of value to the defendant-the agreement by the plaintiff to
"accept[] lower damages." See BRET DICKEY, JONATHAN ORSZAG & LAURA
TYSON, AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF PATENT SETTLEMENTS IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 26-27 (2008), http://www. compasslexecon.com/
highlights/Documents/Economic AssessmentofPatentSettlements_Dickey
Orszagand Tyson.pdf ("In this case, the patent holder pays the infringer to
settle the lawsuit by accepting lower damages-this payment is just obscured by
the fact that on net some cash flows from the infringer to the patent holder.") (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
12 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d at 1333
(footnotes omitted). According to the Federal Circuit:
We find no error in the court's analysis. Pursuant to the Agreements,
the generic defendants agreed not to market a generic version of Cipro
until the '444 patent expired and not to challenge the validity of
the '444 patent, and Bayer agreed to make payments and optionally
supply Cipro for resale. Thus, the essence of the Agreements was to
exclude the defendants from profiting from the patented invention.
This is well within Bayer's rights as the patentee. Furthermore, there is
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"presumed valid," the court held Bayer and Barr's agreement did
not violate antitrust laws.' 3 However, this Recent Development
will illustrate some of the problems with this approach.
Part II of this Recent Development provides a brief overview
of the generic drug industry, pharmaceutical patents, the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, patent
settlements, and anticompetitive settlement agreements. Part II
also discusses In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litigation. Part III discusses a Senate proposal that would
preclude settlements where the patentee pays the alleged patent
infringer and proposes a modification that would allow certain pro-
competitive settlements currently excluded by the legislation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry
Pharmaceutical drugs are costly to develop and market.14 In
addition, pharmaceutical research and development is an uncertain
process.' 5 Thus, patents provide "brand name manufacturers" the
opportunity to recover their initial research and development costs
a long-standing policy in the law in favor of settlements, and this
policy extends to patent infringement litigation.
Id.
" 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) ("A patent shall be presumed valid."); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d at 1337 ("Pursuant to
statute, a patent is presumed valid . . . .") (citation omitted); id. at 1341 (holding
the Sherman Antitrust Act was not violated).
14 The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America reports that
"[i]n 2007, the entire industry invested $58.8 billion in research and
development." PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF
AMERICA, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2 (Mar. 2008), http://www.
amsa.org/business/2008Profile.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology); see also DICKEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 6.
1 See DICKEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 6 ("The research and development
process is lengthy, costly, and uncertain."); id. at 6-7 ( "Only a tiny fraction of
medicines tested are eventually approved for patient use, and only 20 to 30
percent of those approved eventually recoup their R&D investment.") (footnote
omitted).
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by providing a limited duration "monopoly."' 6  "Generic drug
manufacturers" offer lower price versions of previously patented
drugs.17  Once a drug is no longer patented, generic drug
manufacturers reduce the cost to consumers of pharmaceutical
drugs by increasing the availability of lower cost alternatives.' 8
The availability of generic alternatives to patented drugs is credited
with "lower[ing] average prices" and, according to at least one
16 Gathii, supra note 6, at 654 ("United States patents are a necessary
incentive for inventors, allowing them to undertake the risks that go with the
high costs of research and development (R&D). The monopoly period allows
the inventor to recoup any losses by preventing competitors from selling the
patented product during its grace period.") (hyphen omitted) (footnote omitted).
In this Recent Development, the term "brand name manufacturers" is used in a
manner similar to its usage in the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act-
to generally distinguish between prescription drug manufacturers which patent
their products (brand name manufacturers) and those that do not. See Preserve
Access to Affordable Generics Act S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009).
17 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL
R&D: CosTs, RISKS, AND REWARDS 30 (1993), http://www.princeton.edu /
-ota/diskl/1993/9336/9336.PDF ("Once a drug loses patent protection, it is
vulnerable to competition from copies whose therapeutic equivalence is verified
by the FDA. These generic competitors compete largely on the basis of price,
since they can claim no quality advantage over the brand-name drug.") (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). In this Recent
Development, the term "generic drug manufacturers" is used in a manner similar
to its usage in the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act-to generally
distinguish between prescription drug manufacturers which patent their products
and those that do not (generic drug manufacturers). See Preserve Access to
Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009).
18 THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES
AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, xiii (1998), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf [hereinafter 1998 CBO
COMPETITION STUDY] ("After a drug's patent expires, generic copies quickly
gain a large share of its market."); id. ("Various studies have found that generic
entry has little effect on the prices of brand-name drugs . .. Even if brand-name
prices frequently do not respond to generic competition, such competition can
effectively save money because price-sensitive buyers may switch to lower-
priced generic drugs.") (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology); cf HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS, 411-12
(4th ed. 1996) ("Thus in general the price will be higher and the output lower if
a firm behaves monopolistically rather than competitively.").
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study by the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO"), significantly
reducing overall pharmaceutical expenditures by the public.' 9
According to the CBO, generics drugs have helped control
"average prices for drugs that are no longer protected by a
patent." 20
By statute, a patent is granted for twenty years.2 1 During this
time, the patentee has "the right to exclude others from the right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention .... 22 However, "[i]n the case of pharmaceutical
drugs, twenty full years of exclusivity normally are not enjoyed
19 DICKEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 7 ("Numerous economic studies have
consistently found that entry of a competing generic manufacturer typically
leads to lower average prices, and that this price competition typically intensifies
with the entry of additional manufacturers."). According to the Congressional
Budget Office:
The increased use of generic drugs has kept total spending on
prescription drugs below what it might otherwise have been.
Considering only drugs sold through retail pharmacies, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the purchase of
generic drugs reduced the cost of prescriptions . . . by roughly $8
billion to $10 billion in 1994.
1998 CBO COMPETITION STUDY, supra note 18, at 13.
20 1998 CBO COMPETITION STUDY, supra note 18, at 13 ("The dramatic rise in
generic sales since 1984 has held down average prices for drugs that are no
longer protected by a patent."). According to the Congressional Budget Office
("CBO"), the "ero[sion]" in sales does decrease the return that a patentee
receives from the drugs no longer protected by patent. Id. at xiii ("By itself,
generic entry increases the rate at which sales erode after patent expiration, thus
reducing the returns from marketing a new drug."). However, the CBO
concluded, in their 1998 study, that this reduction "has probably not made drug
development unprofitable on average . .. ." Id. ("CBO concludes that since
1984, the expected returns from marketing a new drug have declined by about
12 percent, or $27 million in 1990 dollars. That decline has probably not made
drug development unprofitable on average, but it may have made some specific
projects unprofitable.").
21 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006); see Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSP., 75, 80 (Spring 2005), available at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/patents.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2009)
("Once issued, a patent remains in force until 20 years after the patent
application was originally filed.") (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
22 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
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due to the lengthy amount of time a pharmaceutical company must
spend conducting FDA-mandated clinical trials."23 Regardless,
once a patented drug enters the market, consumers will pay "prices
above competitive levels" for the drug until the patent expires. 24
Upon expiration, competition with generics reduces the "average
price[]" of the drug.25
23 Stephanie E. Piatt, Note, Regaining the Balance of Hatch- Waxman in the
FDA Generic Approval Process. An Equitable Remedy to the Thirty-Month
Stay, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 163, 165 (2003). David Reiffen and
Michael R. Ward have described the process of obtaining FDA approval:
The process of obtaining a New Drug Approval (NDA) from the FDA
is both expensive and time consuming. The manufacturer must
demonstrate, through a series of clinical trials, that the drug is safe and
efficacious. It has been estimated that for the average drug which was
first tested in humans in the 1970s and early 1980s, its producer had
spent over $65 million (in 1987 dollars) on development, and an
additional $48 million on clinical and other testing. In addition, the
clinical trial process took upwards of 7 years. These drugs typically
reached the market in the 1980s.
DAVID REIFFEN & MICHAEL R. WARD, GENERIC DRUG INDUSTRY DYNAMICS 5
(2002), http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/industrydynamicsreiffenwp.pdf
(footnote omitted) (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology). The Hatch-Waxman Act extends the term for
pharmaceutical patents "for a portion of the time lost during clinical testing."
JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW, 17-18 (2005). Specifically:
The period of extension is set to one-half of the testing phase . . . less
any period during which the applicant did not act with due diligence,
plus the entirety of the FDA review period. However, the maximum
extension period is capped at a five-year extension period, or a total
effective patent term after the extension of not more than 14 years.
Id. at 285 (hyphen omitted); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 156(b), (c), (f) (2006).
24 THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL DRUG INDUSTRY 47
(2006), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D.pdf
("Patents provide stronger intellectual-property protection in the pharmaceutical
industry than in many other industries. Firms' expectations of being able to set
prices for new drugs above competitive levels and thus recoup their R&D
investment are crucial to their decisions to innovate. Strong patent protection
supports those expectations.") (footnote omitted) (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
25 See supra notes 18-19; supra note 20 (using the term "average prices").
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B. The Hatch- Waxman Act
1. Legislative Backdrop
Prior to the enactment of the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 ("Hatch-Waxman Act"),
generic manufacturers were required to undergo a similar FDA
approval process as their brand counterparts.26 Also, generic
manufacturers could not begin the process of seeking FDA
approval for their competing product until the patent term expired
on the branded drug.27 These requirements effectively "extended
the [patent] term of the brand-name company's" product because
the brand name manufacturer was not subject to competition while
28
the generic manufacturer was obtaining FDA approval.
Consequently, fewer generic alternatives were available to
consumers after the patent on the brand drug expired.29 Seeking to
26 REIFFEN & WARD, supra note 23, at 5 ("Although the generic producer did
not face the cost of determining which drugs were technically feasible and
economically viable, it still faced the hurdle of demonstrating the safety and
effectiveness of its version before it could obtain FDA approval."); see infra
note 30 (discussing the Hatch-Waxman Act).
27 For example, in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733
F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the Federal Circuit held that the defendant, a
generic drug manufacturer, infringed upon the plaintiffs patent by using the
plaintiffs drug to begin the process of obtaining FDA approval for its generic
competitor. See id. ("Bolar's intended 'experimental' use is solely for business
reasons and not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry. Bolar's intended use of flurazepam hcl to derive FDA
required test data is thus an infringement of the '053 patent."), superseded by
statute, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 84-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
2 8 FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR To PATENT
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 4 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf [hereinafter FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY] ("Thus,
at that time, patent law coupled with the FDA generic approval process, in
effect, extended the term of the brand-name company's patent protection and
delayed market entry by generic versions of brand-name pharmaceutical drug
products.") (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); id.
(explaining that "a generic company could not begin the required FDA approval
process until after patents on the relevant brand-name product had expired").
29 REIFFEN & WARD, supra note 23, at 6 ("Cook (1998) reports that for 13
major drugs with patents expiring between 1990 and 1993, 11 had generic entry
within two months of patent expiration. In contrast, she notes that in Caves,
388 [VOL. 10: 381
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increase the availability of generic pharmaceutical drugs, Congress
crafted the Drug Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984 ("Hatch-Waxman"). 30
2. "Statutory Experimental Use Exception"31
Congress through "[t]he Hatch-Waxman Act modified the
1952 Patent Act by creating a statutory exemption from certain
claims of patent infringement." 32 This exemption is "codified in
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)": 33
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
within the United States or import into the United States a patented
Whinston and Hurwicz's (1991) study of pre-Waxman-Hatch entry (between
1976 and 1982), only 2 of the top 13 drugs had generic entry within one year of
patent expiration."); FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at 4 ("By 1984,
the FDA estimated that there were approximately 150 brand-name drugs whose
patents had expired for which there was no generic equivalent."); see supra
notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
30 See Marcy L. Lobanoff, Anti-Competitive Agreements Cloaked As
"Settlements" Thwart The Purposes of the Hatch- Waxman Act, 50 EMORY L.J.
1331, 1332 (2001) ("In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act in response to the rising prices of prescription
drugs.") (footnotes omitted); N.Y. TIMES, Driving Up Drug Prices, Jul. 26,
2000, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/26/opinion/driving-
up-drug-prices.html ("Dissatisfied with the supply of generic drugs, Congress
passed the Hatch-Waxman act in 1984 to encourage manufacturers to challenge
weak or invalid patents on brand-name drugs.") (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). In addition,
Congress anticipated some costs savings within the federal government. H.R.
REP. No. 98-857(I), at 20 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2653
("This bill may also result in savings if cheaper, generic drugs are made
available for purchase by the federal government. These savings would occur in
various programs throughout the budget such as Medicare, Medicaid, and the
Veterans Administration."). Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 84-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). "Signed into
law on September 24, 1984, that law has come to be known as the Waxman-
Hatch Act or, more commonly, the Hatch-Waxman Act." THOMAS, supra note
23, at 12-13.
3' THOMAS, supra note 23, at 13 (using the term "statutory experimental use
exception").
32 id
3 Id.
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invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological
product . . . ) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products. 34
The principal reason for this statute is to ensure that the patentee's
monopoly is not indirectly extended because of the interplay
between United States patent law and FDA regulations.35 The
effect of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) is that "generic manufacturers may
commence work on a generic version of an approved drug any
time during the life of the patent, so long as that work furthers
compliance with FDA regulations."36
3. Abbreviated New Drug Applications
Hatch-Waxman also established a quicker, separate mechanism
for generic drug manufacturers to obtain FDA approval for their
products. 37  Under Hatch-Waxman, generic drug manufacturers
may file an "Abbreviated New Drug Application" ("ANDA") as
opposed to following the same procedure for new drugs by filing a
"New Drug Application" ("NDA"). 38 "An ANDA may be filed if
the active ingredient of the generic drug is the bioequivalent of the
34 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
3 H.R. REP. No. 98-857(1), at 46 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2679. According to the committee report:
It is the Committee's view that experimental activity does not have any
adverse economic impact on the patent owner's exclusivity during the
life of a patent, but prevention of such activity would extend the patent
owner's commercial exclusivity beyond the patent expiration date.
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress
to grant exclusive rights to an inventor for a limited time. That limited
time should be a definite time and, thereafter, immediate competition
should be encouraged. For that reason, Title I of the bill permits the
filing of abbreviated new drug applications before a patent expires and
contemplates that the effective approval date will be the expiration date
of the valid patent covering the original product. Other sections of
Title II permit the extension of the term of a patent for a definite time
provided certain conditions are met. There should be no other direct or
indirect method of extending patent term.
Id. (hyphen omitted).
36 THOMAS, supra note 23, at 13.
n Id. at 14-15 (discussing the ANDA); see infra note 43.
3 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1) (2006); THOMAS, supra note 23, at 14.
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approved drug." 39 In addition, "[a]n ANDA allows a generic drug
manufacturer to rely upon the safety and efficacy data developed
by the original manufacturer." 40 Hatch-Waxman "continue[s] the
FDA's earlier 'paper NDA' practice by establishing what has come
to be known as a section 505(b)(2) application."41 The
section 505(b)(2) application allows the applicant to "rel[y], . . . in
part, upon safety and efficacy data that the applicant ... did not
itself develop, but rather is available in the published literature."4 2
The effect of both the ANDA and section 505(b)(2) has been an
improvement in the timely introduction of generic drugs on the
market. 43
4. Certifications
For certain types of generic drugs, Hatch-Waxman requires "a
patent certification." 44 Applicants filing a patent certification must
comply with the following:
(vii) a certification, in the opinion of the applicant and to the best of his
knowledge, with respect to each patent which claims the listed drug
referred to in clause (i) or which claims a use for such listed drug for
which the applicant is seeking approval under this subsection and for
which information is required to be filed under subsection (b) or (c) of
this section-
(I) that such patent information has not been filed,
39 THOMAS, supra note 23, at 14. "Bioequivalence means that the rate and
extent of absorption of the generic drug is not significantly different from the
rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug when administered at the same
dosage." FTC GENERIc DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at 5 n.26.
40 THOMAS, supra note 23, at 14-15.
41 Id. at 15.
42 id
43 Id. ("These two expedited marketing approval pathways also allow a
generic manufacturer, in many cases, to place its FDA approved bioequivalent
drug on the market as soon as any relevant patents expire."); id. at 14 nn.84-86.
"This reliance on the innovator's safety and efficacy data allows generic
applicants to save very substantial amounts of money in development costs."
FTC GENERIc DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at 5.
4 THOMAS, supra note 23, at 16. For other generic drugs, applicants can
submit a "section vii statement" if "the Orange Book-listed patent claims a
method of use patent which does not claim a use for which the applicant is
seeking approval." Id.
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(II) that such patent has expired,
(Ill) of the date on which such patent will expire, or
(IV) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is
submitted; . . ..
These provisions "are respectively termed paragraph I, II, III, and
IV certifications."46
5. "Patent Infringement Proceedings"47
As shown above, a paragraph IV certification asserts that the
ANDA applicant's product either does not infringe on a drug
patent or that the referenced patent is invalid.48 Applicants using a
paragraph IV certification must also submit notice to the patentee
that they are seeking approval from the FDA to market a generic
competitor.49 The Patent Act specifically gives patentees the right
to sue for patent infringement upon receipt of this notice.o
Patentees are afforded an automatic 30 month stay of FDA
approval of the ANDA application if they file their patent
infringement suits within 45 days of receiving notice." In this
case, the ANDA may not be approved until the earliest of the
following: "(1) the date the patent(s) expire; (2) a final
determination of non-infringement or patent invalidity by a court
in the patent litigation; or (3) the expiration of 30 months from the
receipt of notice of the paragraph IV certification." 52  These
45 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006).
46 THOMAS, supra note 23, at 16.
47 id
48 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2006).
49 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i) (2006); see also THOMAS, supra note 23, at 16.
'o 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006); see also THOMAS, supra note 23, at 16.
s' 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006); see also THOMAS, supra note 23, at 17;
FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at 7.
52 FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at 7. See 21 U.S.C.
§355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006). The third provision is particularly valuable to the
patent holder:
Congress intended that this latter, 30-month period would give the
parties sufficient time to resolve their patent dispute before the ANDA
applicant introduced its generic product to the market. This period of
time, commonly called the "30-month stay," is effectively the
equivalent of a preliminary injunction that is awarded against the
generic drug company for the stipulated period of time. The 30-month
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provisions of Hatch-Waxman establish a procedure by which drug
patents can be challenged by generic drug manufacturers in court.5 3
6. "Generic Exclusivity"54
In addition to providing a way to facilitate quicker entry of
generic pharmaceutical drugs into the market, Hatch-Waxman also
provides paragraph IV ANDA filers with a "180 day[]" period of
"marketing exclusivity" in which no other ANDA for "the same
drug product" will be approved. 5 This is a significant benefit
because the first filer of the ANDA obtains the economically
valuable position as the sole generic challenger to the brand name
manufacturer during the marketing exclusivity period.56 By
stay is awarded automatically by statute, however, provided that the
brand-name drug company has timely followed the appropriate
procedures. In particular, the brand-name drug company need not
make any of the usual showings required for a preliminary injunction.
THOMAS, supra note 23, at 17. Congress amended the 30-month stay provision
in 2003 so that even if there are multiple patents associated with a single drug,
only one single 30-month stay is allowed for the drug. Id. at 22-23.
" See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006);
Steven W. Day, Note, Leaving Room for Innovation: Rejecting the FTC's
Stance Against Reverse Payments in Schering-Plough v. FTC, 57 CASE W. RES.
223, 228 (2006) ("Through the Act, Congress sought to lower prices of
prescription drugs by encouraging generic drug manufacturers to challenge
patented brand-name drugs and enter the market.").
54 THOMAS, supra note 23, at 18.
5 FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at 7. See also 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006); THOMAS, supra note 23, at 18-19.
56 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (defining the marketing exclusivity
provision); Teresa J. Lechner-Fish, Comment, The Hatch- Waxman System:
Suffering a Plague of Bad Behavior, 5 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 372, 391 (2005)
("'If a generic manufacturer secures the 180-day market exclusivity where its
only competition is the brand-name drug . . .' it can anticipate considerable
profits as health insurance companies modify their plans to include the less-
expensive generic alternative.") (quoting Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the
Hatch- Waxman System: How Pioneer Drug Makers Exploit the Law to Maintain
Monopoly Power in the Prescription Drug Market, 29 J. LEGis. 21, 27 (2002)).
Being the first and sole generic competitor is also valuable because the entry of
additional generic competitors into the market drives the generic drug's market
price down. See 1998 CBO COMPETITION STUDY, supra note 18 at xiii ("As the
number of manufacturers rises, the average prescription price of a generic drug
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making it easier for generic drug manufacturers to seek FDA
approval for the marketing of their products and by providing
significant financial incentive for generic drug manufacturers to
challenge drug patents, Congress has signaled its desire to increase
competition in the pharmaceutical drug market.57
C. The Economic Effect of Hatch- Waxman
A 2002 FTC study examined the effect of Hatch-Waxman on
the pharmaceutical drug market.58 The study analyzed the effect of
Hatch-Waxman Act on drug prices and the availability of generic
drug alternatives. 59 The results are striking; according to the study,
in 1994 alone, "[t]he CBO estimated that .. . the availability of
generic drugs saved purchasers between $8 billion and $10
billion."60 Another commentator stated, "[t]he Hatch-Waxman Act
essentially created the generic drug industry." 61  "Roughly two
decades ago, generics made up only 12 percent of all prescriptions.
Now, generics represent over 50 percent of all prescriptions filled
in the United States . ... 62 These results confirm that Hatch-
Waxman has played a critical role in increasing the availability of
prescription drugs.63
falls.") (hyphen omitted). However, as John Thomas points out, "[I]t is entirely
possible that more than one generic applicant may qualify as a 'first applicant,'
and therefore enjoy 'shared exclusivity' along with the other 'first applicants."'
THOMAS, supra note 23, at 19.
5 See THOMAS, supra note 23, at 18-19.
58 FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 28.
59 id
60 Id. at 10. "Overall, this literature points to significant short-run competitive
impacts of generic entry that can lead to substantial benefits for consumers of
prescription drugs." Id.
61 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Greater Access to Generic Drugs,
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/testtubetopatient/generics.html (last visited Feb.
6, 2009) (quoting Gary Buehler, R.Ph., director of the Food and Drug
Administration's Office of Generic Drugs) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
62 Id. (according to information provided by the Generic Pharmaceutical
Association, quoted by the Food and Drug Administration).
63 FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at i ("Beyond any doubt, Hatch-
Waxman has increased generic drug entry." See also supra notes 60-62.
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D. The Effect of Hatch- Waxman on Pharmaceutical Patents
The effect of Hatch-Waxman on the pharmaceutical patent
landscape is also significant; the FTC estimates that as of 2002,
"the [g]eneric applicant prevailed" in 73% of patent challenges
under Hatch-Waxman that went to court. 64  The litigation made
consumers better off because generic manufacturers were able to
bring additional drugs to the market.65
In addition to litigation, patent challenges under Hatch-
Waxman can be settled pursuant to a settlement agreement.66
However, because these agreements are between competitors, they
risk running afoul of antitrust law.67 Scrutiny of these settlements
64 FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at 16 ("A court decision
resolved the patent infringement claims for 30 drug products. Generic
applicants prevailed 73 percent of the time (22 out of 30), and brand-name
companies prevailed 27 percent of the time (8 out of 30).") (footnote omitted).
6 See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying For Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlement As A Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1553, 1557
(2006) ("If the generic firm wins in litigation, either by establishing that the
patent is invalid or not infringed by the generic firm's competing product, the
generic firm wins the means to enter the market prior to scheduled expiration.
Successful pre-expiration challenges reallocate billions of dollars from
producers to consumers."); see supra notes 60-63.
66 James F. Ponsoldt & W. Hennen Ehrenclou, The Antitrust Legality of
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 37, 40
(2006) ("During the course of patent infringement actions based on paragraph
IV certifications, parties sometimes decide to settle their lawsuits.").
67 See A. Paul Heeringa, Dodging Antitrust Bullets in Patent Settlement
Agreements: Lessons Learned from the "Reverse Payment" Dilemma, 5
DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 265, 269 (2007) ("Courts have recognized that
merely settling a patent dispute, by itself, does not violate antitrust laws. Yet,
patent dispute settlement agreements, like all other potentially anticompetitive
business arrangements, are not immune from antitrust review under the Sherman
Act.") (footnote omitted); id. at 265 ("These settlements commonly occur
between business competitors, often include arguably anticompetitive terms,
and, as such, raise significant antitrust issues."); Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark
Janis & Mark Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property
Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1719, 1720 (2003) ("These settlements involve
agreements between the patentee and the accused infringer, parties who are
often competitors before the lawsuit. Because these competitors may agree to
stop competing, to regulate the price each charges, and to exchange information
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is warranted because consumers may be harmed if firms
"collude." 68  Such agreements may depend to an extent on the
parties' assessment of their respective chances at trial. 69 Thus, the
parties may simply decide that it is in their interest to settle the
patent infringement claim.70 In an infringement suit, the patentee
may seek an injunction against and compensation from an alleged
infringer for violating their patent. A possible settlement
agreement may then involve the alleged infringer offering to pay
72
the patentee in exchange for the patentee dropping the litigation.
One side effect of Hatch-Waxman has been an increase in the
number of "reverse payment" settlements in the pharmaceutical
drug context. 73  Professor Christopher Holman's definition of a
about products and prices, settlements of IP disputes naturally raise antitrust
concerns.").
68 Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Analysis of Patent Settlements Between Rivals,
ANTITRUST 70, 73 (Summer 2003), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley
.edu/shapiro/settleam.pdf ("Sound competition policy should not permit private
parties to enter into agreements that harm consumers by eliminating otherwise
lawful competition.") (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology); see HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS, 459 (4th
ed. 1996) ("Instead of the firms competing against each other in one form or
another they may be able to collude. In this case the two firms can jointly agree
to set prices and quantities that maximize the sum of their profits.") (bold text
omitted).
69 See Shapiro, supra note 68, at 75.
7o Id. at 70-71 (discussing some of the strategic choices involved in patent
settlements); id. at 72 (arguing that both parties in a reverse payment scenario
may decide it is in their interest to settle).
' 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); see also Mark A. Lemley
& Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1085, 1110 (2003) ("The remedies for ordinary patent infringement
include a permanent injunction to prevent future infringement and damages
designed to compensate the patent owner for past infringement.").
72 Michelle Armond, Comment, Introducing the Defense of Independent
Invention to Motions for Preliminary Injunctions in Patent Infringement
Lawsuits, 91 CAL. L. REv. 117, 117-18 (describing a patent settlement where
the patentee was paid hundreds of millions of dollars by alleged infringers who
would rather pay than risk litigation) (2003); cf supra note 71 (discussing
remedies).
7 Jeff Thomas, Schering-Plough and In Re Tamoxifen: Lawful Reverse
Payments in the Hatch- Waxman Context, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 13, 34 (2007)
("Because this scenario 'redistributes the relative risk assessments' of the parties
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reverse payment, which will be adopted for this Recent
Development, is "any agreement between patent litigants, or
potential litigants, wherein the patent owner agrees to provide
some compensation to the alleged infringer, and the alleged
infringer agrees to delay developing or marketing a product."74
Reverse payments are unusual because the patentee (the originator
of the infringement lawsuit) offers to pay the party that it is suing
to delay their entry into the market.75
Some commentators argue that all settlements have a "reverse"
aspect because rational parties will only accept settlements that are
mutually beneficial.76 Nevertheless, assuming that the patentee is
involved in this litigation, courts have noted that 'reverse payments are a natural
by-product of the Hatch-Waxman process."') (quoting In re Ciprofloxacin
Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Schering-Plough
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (1lth Cir. 2005) (quoting In re
Ciprofloxacin), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006); In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d
at 206). According to an FTC press release:
To illustrate this problem, the testimony cited an FTC study released
today containing the staff's analysis of a "disturbing new trend" in drug
settlements filed during the fiscal year ending in September 2006.
According to the study-the third annual report the FTC has issued on
this subject-half of all patent settlements in FY 2006 (14 of 28)
involved compensation to the generic patent challenger and an
agreement by the generic firm to refrain from launching its product for
some time. In the current legal climate, according to the testimony,
"there is every reason to expect the upsurge in these settlements to
continue, and early entry under Hatch-Waxman to decline," because
exclusion payments are highly profitable for brand-name and generic
firms.
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Provides Senate Testimony on
Anticompetitive Patent Settlements in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry (Jan. 17,
2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/01/leibowitztestimony.shtm
(last visited Mar. 12, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
74 Supra Holman, note 11, at 494.
7 Id. ("The 'reverse' designation refers to the direction of the payment from
the patentee to alleged infringer; in most patent litigation settlements, any
payment will typically flow from the alleged infringer to the patentee."); see
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, supra note 73.
76 See supra note 11 (Under this view, the alleged infringer always receives a
benefit-the cessation of litigation.).
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absolutely confident in the strength of their patent, the maximum a
patentee should offer a competitor is the patentee's anticipated
litigation costs to settle the lawsuit. 77  At a higher price, the
78patentee should choose litigation because it is cheaper.
Settlement agreements where the patentee offers to pay an amount
that far exceeds their anticipated litigation costs are suspect not
only because the patentee is the one offering to pay, but also
because they are paying far more than they should if they were
confident in their patent. 79
Reverse payments in the context of Hatch-Waxman, in their
most extreme form, frustrate the intent of Congress-to encourage
generic competition.80 The fact that some generic manufacturers
n Hovenkamp et al., supra note 67, at 1759 n.177 (2003). Patent
infringement lawsuits filed in response to a paragraph IV ANDA filing will
probably not include damages stemming from commercial sales because the
lawsuit predates the approval and sale of the generic product. See THOMAS,
supra note 23 ("This charge of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) is
technical in nature. At this stage the generic manufacturer has done nothing
more than request FDA approval to market a drug.").
7 See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 67, at 1759 n.177 ("For example, if the
patentee was 100% sure of victory in the patent infringement suit, a settlement
payment would not exceed the amount of expected litigation costs.").
79 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litic., 363 F. Supp.2d 514, 534
(E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008). As the district
court in Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. explained:
Plaintiffs' point is well-taken that the greater the chance a court would
hold the patent invalid, the higher the likelihood that the patentee will
seek to salvage a patent by settling with an exclusion payment. If
courts do not discount the exclusionary power of the patent by the
probability of the patent's being held invalid, then the patents most
likely to be the subject of exclusion payments would be precisely those
patents that have the most questionable validity.
Id.; see Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 21, at 91 ("Therefore, large reverse
payments are inconsistent with a claim by the patentholder that its patent very
likely would be found valid if litigated.").
80 See supra notes 30 and 53; infra note 81 and accompanying text. Reverse
payment settlement agreements vary based on their terms. See Holman, supra
note 11, 494-502 (describing different types of reverse payment settlement
agreements). The range of settlement terms can vary widely depending on the
parties' relative bargaining positions. Id. Settlement terms can involve a
combination of cash payments and delayed entry dates. Id. Additionally
settlements can take the form of "'interim settlements' or "'partial settlement
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use the statutory mechanism crafted by Hatch-Waxman to mount a
credible patent challenge, only to later accept a pay-off from the
patentee has prompted stinging criticism and calls for reform from
some members of Congress.8 1
E. Anticompetitive Settlement Agreements
While settlement is usually the judicially favored outcome in
many respects, it may not always result in a positive outcome for
customers.8 2 If the patent is weak, a settlement denies the public
the benefit of a court's invalidation of the patent.83 Because the
patent remains valid, the patentee can nevertheless continue to
agreements."' Id. at 495 (quoting FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 28 at
24, 25 & nn.2-3 (2002)). In these agreements, "the litigants do not settle the
underlying dispute, but the generic company agrees to stay off the market for
some period of time while the patent litigation remains pending." Id. at 495-96.
" 148 CONG. REC. S7566 (2002) ("As a coauthor of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, I can tell you that I find these
type of reverse payment collusive arrangements appalling.") (Statement of
Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah); see Stolberg & Gerth, supra note 7, (according to
Representative Henry Waxman of California, "'[t]he law has been turned on its
head .... We were trying to encourage more generics and through different
business arrangements, the reverse has happened."') (quoting Representative
Henry Waxman of California).
82 Compare Corrected Brief Amici Curiae of AARP, Consumer Federation of
America, Prescription Access Litigation, and Public Patent Foundation In
Support of Appellants, and Reversal at 16, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare
Fund v. Bayer AG, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2008-1097) (arguing
that settlements involving weak patents actually make consumers worse off),
with Julia Rosenthal, Hatch-Waxman Use or Abuse? Collusive Settlements
Between Brand-Name and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 317, 331-32 (2002) ("Additionally, public policy favors the efficient
resolution of disputes, including patent litigation, to conserve judicial resources
and lower transaction costs.") (footnote omitted); cf Holman, supra note 11, at
535 ("Courts favor and encourage settlement, particularly in patent cases. Most
district courts find it difficult to deal with the intricacies of law and technology
that so often pervade patent litigations, and patent cases also generally consume
more judicial resources than other types of litigation.") (footnote omitted).
83 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 21, at 88 ("Invalidating the patent is a
public good that benefits consumers . . . ."); id. ("The key insight is that
invalidating a patent generates significant positive externalities .... ); Shapiro,
supra note 68, at 72.
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exercise its right to exclude subsequent challengers from the
market.84
When the USPTO grants a patent, it confers upon the patentee
"the right to exclude others from profiting from the patented
invention."85 This right stems from the presumptive validity of the
patent.86 However, this presumption is rebuttable, and alleged
infringers have been very successful in challenging patents of
questionable validity. 87 This process of clearing out invalid patents
is socially desirable because it serves as a correction mechanism-
returning to the public domain inventions that should not have
been granted patents.88
84 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006); cf Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 21, at 88-
89 (discussing patentee's rights in a hypothetical scenario).
85 United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H, 670 F.2d 1122, 1127
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
86 Judge Richard Posner stated in Asahi Glass Co. Ltd. v. Pentech Pharms.,
Inc.:
A firm that has received a patent from the patent office (and not by
fraud, a separate issue in this case, discussed later in this opinion), and
thus enjoys the presumption of validity that attaches to an issued patent
... is entitled to defend the patent's validity in court, to sue alleged
infringers, and to settle with them, whatever its private doubts, unless a
neutral observer would reasonably think either that the patent was
almost certain to be declared invalid, or the defendants were almost
certain to be found not to have infringed it, if the suit went to judgment.
289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992-93 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citation omitted).
87 Shapiro, supra note 68, at 74. ("In fact, we have data on the outcome of
patent litigation which tells us that many patents are declared invalid when
challenged."); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the
Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 196-205 (Summer 1998)
(discussing empirical research concluding that in a study of all patents litigated
between 1989 and 1996 46% of all litigated patents were ultimately invalidated);
see infra note 104. But see Day, supra note 53, at 247 (criticizing the Allison
and Lemley study).
88 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 263 (1979) ("Both
holdings relied on the desirability of encouraging licensees to challenge the
validity of patents, to further the strong federal policy that only inventions which
meet the rigorous requirements of patentability shall be withdrawn from the
public domain.") (hyphen omitted); see also Corrected Brief Amici Curiae of 28
Professors of Law, Business, and Economics In Support of Appellants at 10,
Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (No. 2008-1097) ("Patent litigation serves the crucial role of testing weak
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Collusive behavior can lead to undesirable outcomes for
consumers.89 However, the goal of preventing such outcomes
must be carefully balanced against the goal of allowing private
parties to enter into economically efficient transactions-
particularly if those transactions also benefit consumers.90
F. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation
illustrates the conflict between antitrust concerns involving
settlements between competitors and the deference typically given
to patentees to craft settlement agreements. 9' In this case, Bayer's
patent on Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride ("Cipro") was challenged
by Barr. 92  Barr "included a paragraph IV certification" in its
ANDA. 93  Bayer then initiated a patent infringement lawsuit. 94
However, rather than proceed with the litigation, Barr accepted a
"$49.1 million initial payment" from Bayer.95 In exchange, Barr
agreed to delay entry of its generic drug to the market until the last
patents and protecting the public from monopolies based on invalid patents. The
social benefit of invalidating weak patents is well established in Supreme Court
precedent.").
89 See sources cited supra note 68.
90 See Shapiro, supra note 68, at 74 ("Many settlements can benefit consumers
and I even report a theorem stating that under very general conditions there exist
mutually attractive settlements that benefit consumers.").
91 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); id. at 1327-30 (discussing facts of the case
and describing the plaintiffs and defendant's arguments in the lower court
proceedings).
92 Id. at 1328 ("In October 1991, Barr filed an abbreviated new drug
application ('ANDA') for a generic version of Cipro. The ANDA included a
Paragraph IV certification indicating that Barr sought to market its generic drug
before expiration of the '444 patent on the grounds that the patent was invalid
and unenforceable.") (footnote omitted).
93 Id.
94 Id. ("On January 16, 1992, Bayer sued Barr for patent infringement in the
Southern District of New York. Barr answered and counterclaimed for a
declaratory judgment that the '444 patent is invalid and unenforceable and that
its generic ciprofloxacin would not infringe the '444 patent.").
9 Id. at 1329 n.5 ("Added to the $49.1 million initial payment, the payments
from Bayer to Barr totaled $398.1 million.").
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six months of the Cipro patent's term.96 Ultimately, "direct and
indirect purchasers of Cipro and advocacy groups filed several
antitrust actions in federal courts challenging the Agreements." 97
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court
holding that there was no antitrust violation because the settlement
agreement fell within the "exclusionary zone" of the patent.98 In
essence, the Federal Circuit reasoned that because patents are
presumed valid and provide the patentee with the right to exclude
others from the market, the anticompetitive effects of the
settlement agreement (the withholding of drugs from the market)
were directly attributable to the natent.99 Thus, no antitrust remedy
was available to the appellants. o
III. DISCUssIoN
A. Courts Have Declined To View Patents "Probabilistically"10
Some commentators have called for courts to view patents
"probabilistic[ally]"l 0 2 Under this view, patent rights are uncertain
9 6 Id. at 1329 ("Bayer agreed to either supply Barr with Cipro for resale or
make quarterly payments (referred to as 'reverse payments' or 'exclusion
payments') to Barr until December 31, 2003. In return, Barr agreed not to
manufacture, or have manufactured, a generic version of Cipro in the United
States. Beginning at least six months before the '444 patent expired, Bayer
agreed to allow Barr to sell a competing ciprofloxacin product.").
9 Id.
9 Id. at 1332-34.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1333 ("We find no error in the court's analysis. Pursuant to the
Agreements, the generic defendants agreed not to market a generic version of
Cipro until the '444 patent expired and not to challenge the validity of the '444
patent, and Bayer agreed to make payments and optionally supply Cipro for
resale. Thus, the essence of the Agreements was to exclude the defendants from
profiting from the patented invention. This is well within Bayer's rights as the
patentee.").
1o1 See infra note 102 (using the term "probabilistic" with respect to patent
rights).
102 According to antitrust economist Carl Shapiro:
As emphasized by Ayres and Klemperer (1999), a patent is best viewed
as a probabilistic property right. What the patent grant actually gives
the patentholder is the right to sue to prevent others from infringing the
patent. Nothing in the patent grant guarantees that the patent will be
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and are tied to the likelihood that the patent would be upheld.'03
The "probabilistic" view acknowledges the reality that many
patents are incorrectly granted.104 It minimizes the importance of
the patent's statutory presumption of validity because it suggests
that patents merely give patentees the legal right to sue in court to
stop infringement. os Furthermore, courts are not obligated to
declared valid, or that the defendant in the patent suit will be found to
have infringed. In other words, all real patents are less strong than the
idealized patent grant usually imagined in economic theory.
Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34(2) RAND J. OF ECON.
395 (Summer 2003); see generally Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 21 (discussing
the concept of "probabilistic patents").
103 Carl Shapiro has discussed the relationship between "probabilistic" patent
rights and patent settlements:
In my view, the patentholder is not "entitled" to obtain the same level
of profits, or the same rights to exclude rivals, as would the owner of
the fictionalized ironclad patent. Therefore, the patentholder is not
"entitled" to negotiate a monopoly outcome, just because the
patentholder asserts that its patent is valid and infringed by a particular
rival. Rather, the patentholder's rights are calibrated according to the
likelihood that the patentholder would win the patent litigation, and the
extent of exclusion that such a victory would permit.
Shapiro, supra note 102, at 395.
104 Shapiro, supra note 68, at 75. ("In the real world, where issues of validity,
enforceability, and infringement are invariably present, patents are just not as
strong as the idealized 'ironclad' patent that has been proven valid, enforceable,
infringed, and impossible to invent around." ) (hyphen omitted); see supra note
87. But see Day, supra note 53, at 250-52 (criticizing the approach of "The
Probabilists").
105 Commentators Keith Leffler and Cristofer Leffler have commented on the
uncertain nature of patent rights and the presumption of patent validity:
In granting procedural rights to a patent holder, Congress did not
provide that a patent is conclusively presumed to be valid. Rather, the
ultimate validity and scope of a patent cannot be known until final
resolution of such issues by the courts. The patent owner is never
certain of its "right" to exclude others from the use or sale of the
patented invention. Even if the patent owner has knowledge of an
alleged infringement, the patent owner cannot seize allegedly
infringing goods. Moreover, the patent holder may choose not to elicit
governmental efforts to exclude an alleged infringer because the
process is costly. Finally, and most importantly, when the patent
holder does attempt to enforce its rights through the coercive power of
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automatically honor this request due to "a finding of patent
invalidity or non-infringement."' 06 Thus, under this view, until a
patent's ultimate validity is decided in court, the extent to which
the patentee can enforce their right to exclude is uncertain. 0 7
The Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") had taken the
position that settlements where the patentee pays the alleged
infringer deprive the public of a benefit from litigation-the
possibility of increased competition.1os While this perspective has
the government, its efforts may result in a finding of patent invalidity
or non-infringement.
Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, Efficiency Trade-Offs in Patent Litigation
Settlements: Analysis Gone Astray?, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 33, 35-36 (2004)
(footnotes omitted).
106 Id.
107 Id. Regarding the role of the patent's presumption of validity in litigation,
the Federal Circuit stated in Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.:
The presumption, like all legal presumptions, is a procedural device,
not substantive law. It does require the decisionmaker to employ a
decisional approach that starts with acceptance of the patent claims as
valid and that looks to the challenger for proof of the contrary. Thus
the party asserting invalidity not only has the procedural burden of
proceeding first and establishing a prima-facie case, but the burden of
persuasion on the merits remains with that party until final decision.
The party supporting validity has no initial burden to prove validity,
having been given a procedural advantage requiring that he come
forward only after a prima-facie case of invalidity has been made.
With all the evidence in, the trial court must determine whether the
party on which the statute imposes the burden of persuasion has carried
that burden.
713 F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Federal Circuit further stated in In re
Etter:
[T]he presumption is operative to govern procedure
in litigation involving validity of an issued patent. A statute setting
rules of procedure and assigning burdens to litigants in a court trial
does not automatically become applicable to proceedings before the
PTO. Nor can it acquire an independent evidentiary role in any
proceeding.
756 F.2d 852, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Corrected Brief Amici Curiae of 28
Professors of Law, Business, and Economics In Support of Appellants at 9, Ark.
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(No. 2008-1097).
108 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Apparently, the FTC, in recognizing the 'probabilistic' nature
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been discussed in the literature, it was rejected by the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York. 109 The court declined
this interpretation of the patent right in part because it
"undermin[es] the presumption of validity."' 10 It also stated that
viewing patents probabilistically would risk making patent
settlements impossible and "could have far-reaching effects on
everyday patent transactions.""' The Federal Circuit affirmed this
view.112 Given the Federal Circuit's influence on patent issues, its
of the patent interest, recommends that the 'expected value' of the lawsuit at the
time of the settlement be considered in the antitrust analysis."); see Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 17-18, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919
(2006) (No. 05-273), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/08/050829
scheringploughpet.pdf ("If the patent holder and challenger enter into a
settlement in which the challenger gives up the right to enter, for the remaining
term of the patent, in return for a cash payment from the patentee, consumers
would lose the . . . chance . . . of enjoying the benefits of competition.") (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). According to Professor
Holman:
The FTC has essentially taken the position that in every Paragraph IV
litigation, consumers have an expectation interest in the finite
probability that the patent challenge will succeed. In effect, the FTC
would treat this consumer expectation as a probabilistic property right.
The FTC argues that any settlement between the parties that deprives
consumers of the value of this expectation interest is a presumptive
violation of the antitrust laws.
Holman, supra note 11, at 533 (footnote omitted).
109 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514,
533 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Ultimately, however, this argument proves too much.");
see also Holman, supra note 11, at 556 ("Courts have not been receptive
towards the FTC's theory of antitrust liability based on the probabilistic nature
of the patent right, nor the related theory of a consumer expectation interest in
the possibility that the patent challenge might have succeeded were it not for the
settlement."); Day, supra note 53, at 236; supra note 108.
110 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d at 533
("[T]he premise ... results in undermining the presumption of validity that
Congress has afforded patents.").
"11 Id.
112 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d at 1337
("Thus, the district court correctly concluded that there is no legal basis for
restricting the right of a patentee to choose its preferred means of enforcement
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rejection of probabilistic patents will likely influence other circuits
as well.'13
B. Assessing Patent Validity as Part of the Antitrust Analysis
Under this approach, one factor in determining whether a
settlement agreement violates antitrust law is whether the patentee
is "likely to succeed" in an infringement suit. 114 "If the patent is
very weak," a reverse payment could be anticompetitive because
consumers have been deprived of the beneficial effects of
competition that would have resulted from the generic entrant's
successful patent challenge.' 15 Alternatively, "if the patent is very
strong," it would "very likely" be upheld and the generic
competitor would be excluded from the market. 116
The Eleventh Circuit in Schering-Plough Corp v. FTC
advocated assessing a patent's validity as part of its antitrust
analysis. 117 However, the exact level of scrutiny is unclear.' 18 The
and no support for the notion that the Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to
thwart settlements.").
113 Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, U.
ILL. L. REV. 387, 398 (2001) ("Quite to the contrary, the Federal Circuit can
boast of being the only appellate tribunal of national influence, and as perhaps
the world's leading patents court, can claim a healthy measure of international
influence as well.").
114 See discussion supra Part II.E; infra notes 175-177 and accompanying text
(using "likely to succeed" as a specific legal standard; this usage is not intended
in this instance).
115 Carl Shapiro writes further:
If the patent is very strong, i.e., very likely to be found valid and
infringed and difficult to invent around, the challenger is unlikely to
offer much independent competition to the patentholder if litigation
proceeds. Alternatively, if the patent is very weak, ongoing litigation is
likely to lead to greater competition and greater consumer benefits.
Shapiro, supra note 102, at 397.
116 id
117 Schering-Plough Corp., Upsher-Smith Labs v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402
F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005) ("Simply because a brand-name
pharmaceutical company holding a patent paid its generic competitor money
cannot be the sole basis for a violation of antitrust law. This alone underscores
the need to evaluate the strength of the patent.").
118 Id. (stating that the patent strength should be evaluated, but not stating the
precise level of scrutiny). Professor Holman argues that "it would be a mistake
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Second Circuit has refused to examine a patent's validity unless
"the patent litigation is . . . a sham . . . [or] . . . baseless."ll 9 The
Federal Circuit also affirmed this view.' 20
C. The Patent's Exclusionary Zone
According to the Federal Circuit, reverse payment settlements
are generally shielded from antitrust scrutiny because the patentee
has the right to exclude competitors from the market. 12 Thus,
according to the Federal Circuit, without evidence of effects
spilling outside the "exclusionary zone" of the patent, analysis of
these agreements using antitrust principles is inappropriate.122
to assume that the Eleventh Circuit is mandating any inquiry beyond that
required to rebut a charge that the patent suit was fraudulent or objectively
baseless, or that the agreement extends to subject matter clearly exceeding the
scope of the patent claims." See Holman, supra note 11, at 560.
1l9In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 208-09 (2d Cir.
2006) ("In such a case, so long as the patent litigation is neither a sham nor
otherwise baseless, the patent holder is seeking to arrive at a settlement in order
to protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the
manufacture and distribution of the patented product"); accord In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 530
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[I]t is inappropriate for an antitrust court, in determining the
reasonableness of a patent settlement agreement, to conduct an after-the-fact
inquiry into the validity of the underlying patent."); Holman, supra note 11, at
558-67 (2007) (discussing the approaches taken towards analyzing reverse
payment settlements and patent validity by different federal circuits and arguing
that the Eleventh Circuit approach is consistent with that of the Second Circuit);
THOMAS, supra note 23, at 569-84 (discussing the approaches taken towards
analyzing reverse payment settlements by different federal circuits).
120 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2008) ("In addition, we agree with the Second and Eleventh Circuits
and with the district court that, in the absence of evidence of fraud before the
PTO or sham litigation, the court need not consider the validity of the patent in
the antitrust analysis of a settlement agreement involving a reverse payment.").
121 Id. at 1333 ("Thus, the essence of the Agreements was to exclude the
defendants from profiting from the patented invention. This is well within
Bayer's rights as the patentee."); see supra note 120.
122 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d at 1336 ("We
conclude that in cases such as this, wherein all anticompetitive effects of the
settlement agreement are within the exclusionary power of the patent, the
outcome is the same whether the court begins its analysis under antitrust law ...
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One argument raised but rejected as unlikely in the district
court proceedings of In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litigation is that, while the patent term is valid, the patentee would
purchase the cooperation of all potential challengers.' 23  In this
situation, the patentee protects their monopoly position by entering
into agreements with multiple generic competitors.1 24  if
successful, the cumulative effect of these settlement agreements is
that the possibility of competition among generic manufacturers is
also eliminated. 5 According to the FDA, competition among
generic manufacturers significantly reduces the prices of generic
drugs-resulting in even greater savings for consumers.126
However, generic drug manufacturers that settled relatively late
may decide to exit the market once the exclusion period ends
or under patent law . . . . The essence of the inquiry is whether the agreements
restrict competition beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent.").
123 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514,
535 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ( "Moreover, it
is unlikely that the holder of a weak patent could stave off all possible
challengers with exclusion payments because the economics simply would not
justify it."). The FTC subsequently criticized the district court's reasoning in an
amicus brief. Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae Federal Trade Commission In
Support of Appellants and Urging Reversal at 13, Ark. Carpenters Health &
Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Document 2008-
1097).
124 Cf Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical
Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. REv. 11, 25 (2004) ("If there is good reason for
believing the patent invalid others will try the same thing. . . . [A] series of exit
payments to several potential entrants could indicate a wider cartel, and there is
an ample history of litigation among large numbers of rivals being settled with a
comprehensive licensing agreement.").125 id.
126 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Generic Competition and Drug
Prices, http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/generic-competition.htm ("On average, the
first generic competitor prices its product only slightly lower than the brand-
name manufacturer. However, the appearance of a second generic manufacturer
reduces the average generic price to nearly half the brand name price.) (last
visited Feb. 2, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology); id.("As additional generic manufacturers market the product, the
prices continue to fall, but more slowly. For products that attract a large number
of generic manufacturers, the average generic price falls to 20% of the branded
price and lower.")
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rather than compete on the basis of substantially lower prices with
manufacturers whose settlement agreements expired earlier.12 7
D. Congressional Movement on the Issue of Reverse Payments
From a policy perspective, reverse payments, particularly
where large cash payments are involved, are suspicious because
they seem to be solely structured for the benefit of the parties with
no consideration of the public interest. 128 However, the legislative
intent behind Hatch-Waxman is to ensure lower prices and greater
supply of pharmaceutical drugs for the public.12 9 It seems
127 1998 CBO COMPETITION STUDY, supra note 18, at 32 ("Since generic
prices tend to fall as the number of producers rises, generic manufacturers are
most profitable when they are one of the first to enter a market."). Thus, a
generic competitor may leave the market if at the time their settlement expires
the market is too crowded to generate sufficient returns. Id.
128 According to one commentator:
The Hatch-Waxman Act's primary purpose was to decrease the high
cost of prescription drugs by increasing the availability of cheaper
generic versions through the 180-day exclusivity period. In the
beginning, the Act served this objective, as the market realized an
unprecedented increase in generic drug entry. Unfortunately, this
objective is in danger of failing, because the pharmaceutical industry
has found a way to thwart the Act's intentions. As the costs of drug
research and development rise, the pharmaceutical industry feels
increasing pressure to capitalize as much as possible on lucrative drug
patents, which often leads to anti-competitive agreements. Many
brand-name drug companies feel threatened by infringement suits
brought by their generic competitors and, as a result, develop illegal
means to hold onto their patents. By offering generic companies
lucrative cash payments in exchange for an agreement not to enter the
market or not to challenge a patent, brand-name drug companies are
able to hold on to their patents for much longer periods of time than the
Act ever intended. These anti-competitive agreements allow brand-
name pharmaceutical companies to maintain a monopoly on their
patented drugs by significantly impeding generic drug competition.
Lobanoff, supra note 30, at 1354 (footnote omitted).
129 Sarah E. Eurek, Article, Hatch- Waxman Reform and Accelerated Market
Entry of Generic Drugs: Is Faster Necessarily Better?, DuKE L. & TECH. REV.
18 (2003) ("Due to the skyrocketing costs of prescription drugs, consumers have
long argued that they should be allowed greater access to generic alternatives,
which can be obtained at more reasonable prices. . . . In response to these
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plausible, as argued by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"),
that Congress suspected that these settlements were one obstacle
preventing fair competition.' 30 Through Hatch-Waxman, Congress
successfully decreased pharmaceutical drug prices and increased
the number of generic alternatives offered to consumers.131 Now,
"pay-for-delay" tactics threaten to unravel this progress.' 3 2
1. The PAAGA
In response to the threat posed by these anticompetitive
settlements between brand name and generic manufacturers,
Senators Herb Kohl of Wisconsin, Chuck Grassley of Iowa, Russ
Feingold of Wisconsin, Richard J. Durbin of Illinois, and Sherrod
Brown of Ohio introduced the Preserve Access to Affordable
Generics Act on February 3, 2009 ("PAAGA").133 The PAAGA is
concerns, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act (the 'Hatch-Waxman Act'), in 1984."); see supra note 53.
130 Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae Federal Trade Commission In Support of
Appellants and Urging Reversal at 23-24, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare
Fund v. Bayer AG, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2008-1097) ("Congress,
as evident by its 2003 amendments, justifiably viewed patent settlements
involving exclusion payments with suspicion, and thus mandated that they be
reviewed by the antitrust authorities."); id. at 26-27 ("The court . . . ignored the
ample evidence . . . showing that Congress-while preserving legitimate patent
rights-has specifically sought to encourage litigation challenging
pharmaceutical patent claims, in order to facilitate the market entry of low-cost
generic drugs.").
131 See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
132 See Drugs.com, Sens. Kohl, Grassley Introduce Bill to Stop Industry
'Payoffs' That Delay Generic Drugs, DRUGs.COM, Feb. 3, 2009,
http://www.drugs.com/news/sens-kohl-grassley-introduce-bill-stop-industry-
payoffs-delay-drugs-15983.html (quoting Senator Herb Kohl of Wisconsin using
the term "pay-for-delay" regarding reverse payment settlement agreements) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
" S. 369, 11Ith Cong. (2009); see id. at § 2(a) (stating Congressional
findings); id at § 2(b) (stating purpose of the PAAGA). The PAAGA was also
introduced on January 17, 2007 during the 1 10th Congress. S. 316, 110 Cong.
(2007); see JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 2008
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT, 171-72 (2008) (discussing the 2007 PAAGA);
Holman, supra note 11, at, 578-84 (discussing and analyzing the 2007
PAAGA). According to one press account, that legislation was "stalled in
Congress in the face of major lobbying by the drug industry." Msnbc.com,
Lobbying Stalls Generic Drug Legislation, Nov. 13, 2007,
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based in part on the finding that, "settlements which include a
payment from a brand name manufacturer to a generic
manufacturer to delay entry by generic drugs are anti-competitive
and contrary to the interest of consumers." 3 4 The PAAGA has
three purposes:
(1) to enhance competition in the pharmaceutical market by prohibiting
anticompetitive agreements and collusion between brand name and
generic drug manufacturers intended to keep generic drugs off the
market;
2) to support the purpose and intent of antitrust law by prohibiting
anticompetitive agreements and collusion in the pharmaceutical
industry; and
(3) to clarify the law to prohibit payments from brand name to generic
drug manufacturers with the purpose to prevent or delay the entry of
competition from generic drugs.135
The PAAGA seeks to promote competition within the
pharmaceutical industry through an amendment to the Clayton
Act,136 which forbids:
[A]ny person, in connection with the sale of a drug product, to directly
or indirectly be a party to any agreement resolving or settling a patent
infringement claim in which-
(1) an ANDA filer receives anything of value;
and
(2) the ANDA filer agrees not to research, develop, manufacture,
market, or sell the ANDA product for any period of time.m
Because the PAAGA prohibits individuals from participating in
agreements where the generic competitor (the ANDA filer)
"receives anything of value" and also "agrees not to research,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21768088/ ("Legislation aimed at speeding the
availability of cheaper generic drugs has stalled in Congress in the face of major
lobbying by the drug industry.") (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law
& Technology).
134 Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369 111th Cong. § 2(a)(l 1)
(2009) (hyphens omitted).
'1 Id. at § 2(b) (hyphens omitted).
136 See Id. at § 3(a); supra note 135.
137 Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369 111th Cong. § 3(a)(1 1)
(2009) (quotations omitted) (hyphens omitted).
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develop, manufacture, market, or sell" its drug, the PAAGA
prohibits participation in reverse payment agreements involving
cash payments to the alleged infringer.' 38 The PAAGA clearly
proscribes participation in reverse payment agreements "in
connection with the sale of a drug product."l 39
2. The PAAGA Prohibits Some Efficient Settlement Agreements
The bright line rule established by the current PAAGA does
have some potential drawbacks. A patent infringement lawsuit is
likely once a paragraph IV ANDA is filed by a generic
pharmaceutical manufacturer.140  This is because, as discussed
above, Hatch-Waxman requires that the ANDA filer provide notice
to the NDA holder upon their filing of the ANDA. 4 The NDA
holder then must file a patent infringement suit within forty-five
days to block the FDA approval process for the ANDA.1 42 While
there is a strong public policy interest in testing patents in court,
there are several situations where settlement is more efficient. 143
The first case is where the patent is strong and the patent is
likely to be upheld in court. 14  In this scenario, a settlement
1
3 8 Id.; see supra notes 74-75 (defining and discussing reverse payment).
13 Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369 111th Cong. § 3(a)(1 1)
(2009); see supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
140 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006) (stating that if no infringement suit
is filed by the patentee within forty-five days of receiving notice from the
ANDA filer, the FDA can proceed to immediately approve the ANDA).
141 Id.; see discussion supra Part II.B.5.
142 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006); see discussion supra Part II.B.5.
143 See Shapiro, supra note 102, at 408 ("This is not to say that such payments
are necessarily anticompetitive if other factors are brought into the analysis,
such as risk aversion and asymmetric information about market conditions, as
'reverse cash payments' may be important in more complex settings for
successful settlement."); Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement ofPatent
Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L.
REv. 747, 782 (2002) ("In general, . . . [a]t high levels of probability that the
patentee will prevail in the lawsuit, the costs of prohibiting exit payments
outweigh the costs of permitting them, and vice versa."); supra notes 87-88 and
accompanying text (discussing the value of invaliding improperly granted
patents).
144 Cf Hovenkamp et al., supra note 67, at 1758 (analyzing, but not labeling,
the strategy employed by a patentee in the case where the patentee is sure of the
patent's strength).
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agreement where the NDA holder pays the ANDA filer any
amount up to the anticipated cost of litigation is efficient because
the NDA holder spent no more than it would have in litigation to
defend its patent, the ANDA filer received more than it would have
defending itself in an infringement case it was bound to lose, and
the public is no worse off because the patent would have been
upheld.145 By prohibiting settlements involving transfers of
"anything of value," the PAAGA increases the likelihood that even
strong pharmaceutical patents will be tested in court; the PAAGA
ensures a less efficient outcome in cases where the underlying
patent is strong.146
Perhaps more importantly, because the PAAGA prohibits cash
payments to the ANDA filer, the PAAGA prohibits settlements
that could benefit consumers but are impossible without some
combination of a delayed generic drug entry date and a cash
payment.147 The PAAGA draws a distinction between the ANDA
145 Id. ("Even a patentee sure to win would be willing to pay a defendant a
sum up to the cost of the lawsuit to end the litigation and avoid that cost."); id. at
1751 ("Transaction costs change the picture somewhat. If bringing and winning
an infringement suit costs $1 million, the patentee might be willing to pay the
infringement defendant up to that much because the cost of the settlement would
be lower than the cost of an injunction."); id. at 1758-59 ("Thus, if the patentee
is sure to win, the second number is zero and the exclusion payment is no more
than the cost of litigation."); cf Shapiro, supra note 68, at 70-71 ("If the patent
is virtually certain to prove valid, a settlement by which the challenger agrees
not to compete using infringing products must pass my proposed test....
[U]nder my proposed approach, an arbitrarily small chance that the challenger
would prevail in the patent suit cannot form the basis for an antitrust challenge
of such a settlement.") (emphasis in original). Damages are not considered in
here because an infringement suit under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) would likely
predate the actual sale of the allegedly infringing drug. See supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 143-145; see discussion supra Part III.D. 1.
147 See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong.
§ 3(a) (2009) (prohibiting transfers from the NDA holder of "anything of value"
to the ANDA filer); Robert D. Willig & John P. Bigelow, Antitrust Policy
Toward Agreements that Settle Patent Litigation, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 655,
672-73 (Fall 2004) (proposing and discussing scenarios where the patentee and
the alleged infringer hold "asymmetric expectations" about "their chances of
success in the litigation").
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filer receiving "anything of value" (which is prohibited) and an
agreement where the ANDA filer obtains permission to market its
product before the expiration of the NDA holder's patent (which is
allowed).148
This provision allows settlements where the NDA holder and
the ANDA filer negotiate solely on the basis of the entry date of
the filer's product. This type of settlement may be beneficial to
the parties because both parties would save litigation costs. 150 In
this scenario, the ANDA filer ("the entrant") would agree to delay
its entry date as long as "the postponement were not so protracted
that the cost to the entrant in lost profits were more than what it
saved in avoided litigation costs."' 5  The NDA holder ("the
incumbent") "would be willing to" accept an earlier generic
product entry date "if the cost in foregone profit were not greater
than the saved litigation costs." 52 Consumers would still benefit as
long as the generic drug entered the market earlier than it would
have had the parties pursued litigation.153
148 S. 369, 111th Cong. § 3(a).
149 Id. ("Nothing in this section shall prohibit a resolution or settlement of
patent infringement claim in which the value paid by the NDA holder to the
ANDA filer as a part of the resolution or settlement of the patent infringement
claim includes no more than the right to market the ANDA product prior to the
expiration of the patent that is the basis for the patent infringement claim.")
(hyphens omitted).
150 Willig & Bigelow, supra note 147, at 657 ("[T]here are likely to exist
voluntary mutually beneficial settlements between the patent holder who claims
infringement and the firm seeking to enter that are favorable to consumer and
social welfare. Under such . . . settlements, entry is permitted at an intermediate
date . . . . "); id. at 658 ("[S]uch settlements . . . assure entry will occur at a time
that is consistent with the expected (average) value of the entry time resulting
from the litigation, while eliminating the costs of litigation that fall on the firms
. . . ."); id. at 664 (discussing the incentives for parties to negotiate on the entry
date when cash payments are not allowed in order to save litigation costs).
'5' Id. at 664-65.
152 Id. at 665.
153 Id. ("Since earlier entry is also preferred by consumers to later entry, this
means there are some settlements that are mutually agreeable to the parties that
are better for consumers than litigation.").
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However, in certain situations, negotiating an entry date alone
is not sufficient for settlement.154  Economists Robert D. Willig
and John P. Bigelow argue that one such situation is where the
ANDA filer is "overly optimistic" about its chances of success
through litigation. 55  Because the ANDA filer has misjudged its
position, the ANDA filer will not settle for a postponed entry
date. 56 This scenario is essentially one where the patent is strong,
the patentee knows it, but the alleged infringer does not.'5
According to Willig and Bigelow, "a cash payment" by the
NDA holder can "bridge the gap" because the NDA holder and the
ANDA filer "attach different values at the margin to moving the
date of entry."' 58 For the NDA holder, each additional day that the
ANDA filer can be delayed "increases profit by the difference
between one day's worth of monopoly and one day's worth of
duopoly."l 59  Related, this amount represents the excess of
154 Id. at 673 ("In such cases, cash payments enable a settlement that is
preferred to litigation by both firms and by consumers, and there is no settlement
possible at all without a cash payment.") (hyphen omitted); id. at 672
(discussing the "misplaced optimism" example of the "asymmetric
expectations" model); id. at 673 ("[I]f the two parties are collectively
overoptimistic . . . then no settlement without cash is possible"); id. (discussing
the "varied assessments of success" example of the "asymmetric expectations"
model).
1 Id. at 672 ("Consider, first, the case in which the entrant is overly
optimistic regarding its chances of success at litigation."); see infra note 162
(discussing terminology). But see Shapiro, supra note 102, at 397 (suggesting
that the problems of "asymmetric information" and "optimism" "may be
modest" in patent settlements).
156 Willig & Bigelow, supra note 157, at 672 ("[T]he entrant (mistakenly)
believes the chance of the incumbent winning the litigation is so small that the
gap between the entrant's view of the expected date of entry under litigation,
and the incumbent's view (here assumed to be correct) is so large that even the
prospect of saving their litigation costs is insufficient to bring the two parties
together on a mutually acceptable agreement in terms of a date of entry.").
57 id.
158 Id. (using the term "bridge the gap").
159Id. A market characterized as a "duopoly" is one where only two firms
compete. See VARIAN, supra note 18, at 459 ("For simplicity, we will usually
restrict ourselves to the case of two firms; this is called a situation of duopoly.")
(bold omitted).
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monopoly profits over profits where there are two competitors in
the market (the NDA holder and the ANDA filer).160  To the
ANDA filer, each day that the entry date is postponed represents a
loss of "one day's worth of duopoly" profits.' 6 1 According to
Willig and Bigelow, economic theory predicts that the "the
incumbent" (the NDA holder) gains more than "the entrant" (the
ANDA filer) loses for each day of delay.' 62 "Thus a large enough
payment may enable the parties to reach an agreement, and under
the right conditions may enable them to reach an agreement with
date of entry being earlier than the actual expected date of entry
under litigation."l 63 Since the PAAGA does not allow the NDA
holder to make cash payments to the ANDA filer, the PAAGA
would preclude settlements where the ANDA filer is too optimistic
about its chances of success through litigation.164
The second case is where both the NDA holder's and ANDA
filer's assessments of their respective likelihoods of succeeding at
litigation are "at odds with the truth." 165 This scenario could occur
"if the two parties are collectively overoptimistic."l 66 If neither
party accurately assesses its chances of success, Willig and
Bigelow argue that settlement is impossible without a cash
payment.167
According to Willig and Bigelow, a cash payment is required
because the earliest generic entry date the NDA holder will accept
is the day after the anticipated "date of entry" had the litigation
160 Willig & Bigelow, supra note 147, at 672; supra note 159.
161 Willig & Bigelow, supra note 147, at 672.
162 Id. In this Recent Development, the terms "NDA holder" and "ANDA
filer" will be used synonymously with Willig and Bigelow's "incumbent" and
"entrant," respectively.
163 Id. at 673 (hyphen omitted); see supra note 154 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text (discussing the PAAGA's
proscription on cash payments); supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text
(discussing Willig and Bigelow's model of an "overly optimistic" market entrant
(the ANDA filer)).
165 Willig & Bigelow, supra note 147, at 673.
166 Id. "Collectively overoptimistic" in this context means that each party
views its chances of success too highly. Id.
167 Id. ("[N]o settlement without cash is possible.").
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commenced.168 Similarly, the ANDA filer would accept a generic
entry date no later than its anticipated date under litigation. 169In
this situation, Willig and Bigelow argue that the date that the NDA
holder would accept would be later than the date the ANDA filer
would accept because "the two parties are collectively optimistic;"
thus "no settlement without cash is possible." 70
Willig and Bigelow's analysis suggests that the NDA holder
and the ANDA filer could craft "a settlement . . . includ[ing] cash
and a date of entry that is an improvement over litigation for
consumers" in this situation. 171 "[S]ince the "marginal value of a
day of monopoly" is worth more to the NDA holder "than the
marginal value of a day of duopoly" to the ANDA filer, the NDA
holder could pay the ANDA filer for the days falling in between
the dates the parties prefer; however, this arrangement would be
prohibited by the PAAGA.172
3. A Proposed Modification
Because the PAAGA precludes all settlements where the
patentee pays the alleged infringer, some potentially efficient
agreements are prohibited.173  One possible modification to the
PAAGA would require courts to take a "quick look" at settlements
involving cash payments from the NDA holder.174 This approach,
168 Id. ("Absent any cost to litigation, and ruling out cash payments, the
incumbent will agree only to settlements that offer entry at a later date than the
incumbent's expected date of entry under litigation, and the entrant will only
agree to settlements in which entry comes earlier than the entrant's expected
date of entry under litigation.").
169 Id
170 id
"' Id
172 Id; see supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text (discussing the
PAAGA's proscription on cash payments).
173 See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text (discussing the PAAGA's
proscription on cash payments); see discussion Part III.D.2 (discussing certain
types of efficient settlements that would be prohibited under the PAAGA).
174 Crane, supra note 143, at 785 ("[C]ourts or agencies evaluating the
competitive impact of an exit payment settlement should make an abbreviated
examination of the merits. A 'quick look' approach is familiar under Section 1
of the Sherman Act, and a similar approach could be adopted to evaluate patent
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advocated by Professor Crane, although not specifically as a
modification to the PAAGA, is summarized below:
[T]he court could require the parties to submit affidavits
and hold a hearing similar to a preliminary injunction
hearing. If, based on a "quick look," the court concluded
that the patent infringement claim was likely to succeed,
the exit payment settlement should be approved without
further inquiry. Conversely, if the quick look raised
significant doubts regarding the validity of the patent, the
exit payment would not be permitted-at least not without
a more thorough adjudication of the patent's validity.175
Applying this proposal as a modification to the PAAGA, a court
would determine whether the patentee (the NDA holder) "was
likely to succeed" in the infringement litigation.176 If so, a
infringement settlements.") (footnote omitted). Professors Blair and Cotter also
recommend a similar "quick look" approach. See also Roger D. Blair &
Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent Disputes Illegal Per Se?,
ANTITRUST BULL, 491, 534 (Summer-Fall 2002). Another commentator
proposes requiring brand name manufacturers to seek preliminary injunctions
while the patent litigation is being resolved. Lobanoff, supra note 30, at 1355
("Relying on preliminary injunctions instead of secret out-of-court settlements,
and requiring DOJ notification of proposed pharmaceutical settlements, will
ensure that the parties will take accountability for their actions.").
175 Crane, supra note 143, at 785. One difference between Professor Crane's
approach and the approach proposed here is that Professor Crane proposed
limiting the "quick look" approach to situations "[w]here a preliminary
injunction motion has not been litigated." Id. Hovenkamp et al. also propose a
similar but more restrictive solution where an "ex ante" evaluation of the
patent's strength is undertaken:
We suggest the following rule. In an antitrust challenge, a payment
from a patentee to an infringement defendant for the latter's exit from
the market is presumptively unlawful, shifting the burden of proof to
the infringement plaintiff. The infringement plaintiff can defend by
showing both (1) that the ex ante likelihood of prevailing in its
infringement lawsuit is significant, and (2) that the size of the payment
is no more than the expected value of litigation and collateral costs
attending the lawsuit.
Hovenkamp et al., supra note 67, at 1759.
176 Crane, supra note 143, at 785 (using the term "likely to succeed" as the
relevant standard for the "quick look" test).
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settlement agreement that involves a cash payment should be
allowed.177
This approach still enables both parties to save litigation costs
stemming from a full trial, and the generic drug could enter the
market earlier depending on the settlement terms.178 Furthermore,
where the ANDA filer is "overly optimistic," or where both parties
view their chance of success under litigation too positively, this
modification to PAAGA would still allow for the possibility of
settlement with a cash payment as an option. 79
Although the Federal Circuit in In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation declined to perform a "post hoc
analysis" of the Cipro patent's validity, the settlement agreement
probably would have been upheld under an application of the
modified PAAGA suggested above. so Because Bayer successfully
defended its patent against four subsequent challengers, it seems
reasonable to infer that Bayer's patent was strong and that it
probably would have withstood scrutiny in a "quick look"
177 Id. ("If, based on a 'quick look,' the court concluded that the patent
infringement claim was likely to succeed, the exit payment settlement should be
approved without further inquiry."). According to Professor Crane:
In practice, application of this standard would probably turn into
something akin to the "preponderance of the evidence" standard used in
civil litigation or the "reasonable likelihood of success" standard used
for preliminary injunctions, both of which generally require a tipping
of the scales, or a 51% probability. This probably is a more sensible
place to draw the line than higher standards of proof such as "beyond a
reasonable doubt" or "clear and convincing," particularly if the grant of
a preliminary injunction upon a "reasonable likelihood" showing is
sufficient to permit an exit payment.
Id. at 791.
178 See supra discussion Part III.D.2.
179 See supra discussion Part III.D.2.
1so ln re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (concluding "in the absence of evidence of fraud before the
PTO or sham litigation, the court need not consider the validity of the patent in
the antitrust analysis of a settlement agreement involving a reverse payment.").
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proceeding as well.'8 ' Rather than relying on the presumption of
validity, the court's reasoning would have been based on an
objective consideration of the patent's validity.' 82
If the PAAGA, currently before the Senate, was in place at
the time of the antitrust lawsuit, the only possible settlement option
would be based on delayed entry date. 83 However, Bayer and
Barr did negotiate a modified entry date of six months before
Bayer's patent expired.184 Apparently, the modified entry date
alone was not sufficient to induce a settlement.' Presumably, the
cash payment was included so that Barr would settle.' 86 Given the
subsequent success Bayer had in defending its patent from other
challengers, it is possible that Barr misjudged its chances at trial.' 87
Based on Willig and Bigelow's model, it is conceivable that Barr
would not have settled without the cash payment, and under the
PAAGA the parties would have been required to litigate.' 88
181 Id. at 1338 ("Indeed, the patent was subsequently challenged by four other
generic manufacturers and was upheld as valid."); see supra notes 175 and 177
and accompanying text.
182 See discussion supra Part II.F; supra notes 175 and 177 and accompanying
text.
183 See supra notes 137-139, 148-149 and accompanying text (discussing the
PAAGA's proscription on cash payments and the option of negotiating based on
entry date).
184 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d at 1329
("Beginning at least six months before the '444 patent expired, Bayer agreed to
allow Barr to sell a competing ciprofloxacin product.").
185 Id. ("In exchange, Bayer agreed to make a settlement payment to Barr of
$49.1 million.").
18 id.
187 See discussion supra Part III.D.2 (discussing Willig and Bigelow's model
of the "overly optimistic" market "entrant"); see supra notes 184-186 and
accompanying text.
188 See discussion supra Part III.D.2 (discussing Willig and Bigelow's model
of the "overly optimistic" market "entrant" and the requirement of a cash
payment to induce settlement); supra notes 137-139, 148-149 and
accompanying text (discussing the PAAGA's proscription on cash payments and
the option of negotiating based on entry date).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Hatch-Waxman Act represents an attempt by Congress to
reduce the cost of pharmaceutical drugs by creating a system by
which improperly issued pharmaceutical patents can be
challenged.189  It also creates powerful incentives for generic
manufacturers to do so.190 According to the Congressional Budget
Office, the generic drugs now save consumers billions of dollars
annually.191 The practice by patentees of simply purchasing the
cooperation of generic challengers threatens to undermine this
progress.192
The PAAGA is one possible solution, but in its current form it
is a blunt instrument.1 93 It flatly prohibits all settlements involving
"anything of value," even if the settlement would nonetheless
benefit consumers. 194  One drawback of this approach is that it
would force parties to litigate even when: the patent is strong, the
ANDA filer is too optimistic about their chances at trial, and
depending on the probability of that the patent is valid where
neither party has an accurate assessment of their chances at trial.' 95
The proposed modification to the PAAGA suggested in this Recent
Development would allow cash payments only if the patentee
could show in a "quick look" proceeding that they would likely
succeed in their patent infringement suit.196  This proposal also
recognizes that in a patent settlement, cash payments can induce
189 See discussion supra Part II.B.
190 See discussion supra Part II.B.6.
191 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Generic Competition and Drug
Prices, http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2009) ("According to
the Congressional Budget Office, generic drugs save consumers an estimated $8
to $10 billion a year at retail pharmacies. Even more billions are saved when
hospitals use generics.") (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
192 See discussion supra Part III.
193 See discussion supra Part III.D.2.
194 Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. § 3(a)
(2009); see discussion supra Part III.D.2.
195 See supra discussion Part III.D.2.
196 See discussion supra Part III.D.3 (proposing an application of Professor
Crane's "quick look" solution to the PAAGA).
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parties to settle that would not otherwise if the only bargaining tool
available is the generic entry date in ways that are still beneficial
for consumers. 197  However, by requiring that the patentee
demonstrate that its patent litigation is "likely to succeed," the
modification to the PAAGA suggested in this Recent Development
helps ensure that the patent at issue is not "used as a fig leaf to
cover an agreement note to compete."l 98
197 See discussion supra Parts III.D.2, III.D.3.
198 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 21, at 91 ("In the limiting case as P
approaches zero, a weak patent can be used as a fig leaf to cover an agreement
not to compete."); supra notes 175-177 and accompanying text (using "likely to
succeed" as a specific legal standard).
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